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ALTERATIONS OF ACCRUED DIVIDENDS: II*
Arno C. Bechtt
3. Techniques in Removing Accrued Dividends [continued]

(d) Exchange of Old Shares for Prior Stock, with Other Changes
Making the Old Stock Less Desirable. If, in addition to its power to
issue prior stock, the majority has the power also to alter the other provisions of the old preferred for the worse, it can increase the pressure on
dissenters to exchange their shares. This device is so obvious that it is
strange that it has not been more employed. Of the five cases found
using it, all sustained the amendments. Four of the five cases were decided under the Delaware statutes, but only one of them by the Delaware court. The first of these was Morris v. American Public Utilities
Co.,1° 5 which has already been discussed. Next, in Y oakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.,1° 0 the corporation had first preferred, second
preferred and common stock. The first preferred had a 7% cumulative
dividend, a redemption and liquidation preference of $1 IO per share,
was entitled to a sinking fund of $20,000 per year for its retirement, had
power to elect two directors, and had exclusive voting control on default
in the sinking fund or on eighteen months' accrual of dividends. The
corporation had met the sinking fund requirement, but dividends of
$42 per share had accrued on the first preferred and of $45 per share
on the second preferred. The amendment created a class of prior preferred with a par value of $50 and 7% cumulative dividends, and another class of prior preferred with dividends only partially cumulative
for two years and thereafter fully so; the amendment also increased the
number of shares of common stock. For one share of old first preferred
one share of each of the new preferred classes would be issued, plus one
half share of common, with the right to take another half share of common for $20 per share. As a condition to the exchange, the stockholder
had to waive accrued dividends. The president and vice-president
"' This article is one of a series submitted in _partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
[Part I appeared in the January issue, 49 MicH. L. R.nv. 363 (1951).-Ed.]
t Professor of Law, Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri.-Ed.
l05 See the discussion in Part I of this article, 49 MicH. L. R.nv. 363 at 389-391 (1951).
The amendment reduced the redemption price of the shares and took away their voting
power. It seemed more convenient, however, to deal with the case as a plain problem in
pressure caused by exchanging for prior stock, especially because the voting power was
taken away from all the preferred stock, including the new prior issue.
106 (D.C. R.I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533. See comments: 15 CoRN. L.Q. 279 (1930); 43
HAnv. L. R.nv. 656 (1930); 14 MINN. L. Rnv. 413 (1930) and note, 16 VA. L. R.nv. 282
(1930). See also comment, 28 MicH. L. R.nv. 1009 0930).
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owned all the second preferred and about 80% of the common. They
agreed to surrender all the second preferred and its accrued dividends
for 20,000 additional shares of common stock. The amendment also
provided that dividends were not to be cumulative on the old preferred
for the future, that it was to have no voting rights except the right to
elect two directors, that it should have no pre-emptive rights, and that
its sinking fund should be abolished. The court held that the sinking
fund could not constitutionally be abolished, a matter not within the
scope of this article,107 but it sustained all the rest of the amendment
under the Delaware law and the provisions of the charter. It held that
the corporation could pay dividends on the new prior stock before the
accrued dividends on the old stock, so long as rights in existing surplus
were protected, and that the amendment properly provided for such
protection. The court was certainly fully aware of the effect on dissenters of the provisions limiting the interests of the preferred stock for
the future:
"It is urged by respondent that the exchange of the first preferred stock for the securities described is permissive, not compulsory. This interpretation, however, cannot be taken seriously. The
circumstances created in the plan here presented, irrespective of
the language employed, amount to compulsion. The exchange is
in law compulsory, if to refrain therefrom would result in an obvious and substantial loss. The circumstances created to induce
or compel the exchange of all first preferred stock for the securities described are the result of provisions incorporated in the
arnendmeFl.ts."108
The court then catalogued the changes made in the old preferred stock
and added:
"In other words, if the holder of first preferred stock were to
elect not to make the exchange, he would be left with a stock still
called first preferred, but stripped of nearly every characteristic
which gave it value. The outstanding shares would no longer be
annually reduced through purchase or redemption from the sinking fund. The dividends thereon would no longer be cumulative,
and the stock would be shorn of any effective voice in the management of the affairs of the corporation."109
107 This phase of the decision is discussed in another article, entitled: "Changes in the
Interests of Classes of Stockholders by Corporate Charter Amendments Reducing e!apital,
and Altering Redemption, Liquidation and Sinking Fund Provisions,'' 36 CoRN. L.Q. 1
(1950).
10s (D.C. R.I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533 at 537.
109Jbid.
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Nevertheless, the court sustained this part of the amendment. The decision means, then, that the majority can, besides introducing a prior
stock, attack the future provisions of the old preferred stock.
The California appellate court reached the same result in Blumenthal 11. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp.,110 decided under the Delaware statute,
in which the amendment, besides providing for exchange for a new
prior participating preferred on condition of cancellation of accrued
dividends, also removed the cumulative feature of the old stock. And
a similar amendment, removing the cumulative feature of the preferred
stock was sustained in Barrett 11. Denver Tramway Corp.,1 11 also decided under the Delaware law.
In the only remaining case, the Illinois Supreme Court also approved the amendment.112 The corporation had preferred stock with
a par value of $50 and an 8% cumulative dividend. The amendment
created a prior preferred class and a second preferred. The old preferred automatically became the new second preferred, with a par
value reduced to $10 per share, but it seems that its liquidation value
was not reduced. Hence, it could be argued that the change in par value did not actually change its interests in the property of the corporation. The amendment also destroyed the right of the old preferred to
convert to common, unless it was first converted to first preferred with
waiver of accrued dividends. Upon conversion to first preferred, 1.4
shares of the new stock were issued for one share of the old, if it was
done by a certain date and thereafter the exchange was to be share for
share. The plaintiff contended that the amendment made the exchange
compulsory. The court said:

"... If there was any compulsion to make the exchange, it
arises from the impairment of the value of the preferred stock, and
not from any express provision in the amendments. It is not questioned that the value of a class of stock might be so decreased by
amendments to the articles of incorporation by creating prior rights
in other classes of stock, that a holder, to avoid serious loss, would
be compelled to exchange his stock for stock in the class holding
the priority."113
After recognizing the possibility, the court held that this was not such
a case:
110 30 Cal. App. (2d) 11, 85 P. (2d) 580 (1938).
111 (:3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 701, affirming (D.C.
112 Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 lli. 364, 29 N.E.

11s Id. at 369.

Del. 1944) 53 F. Supp. 198.
(2d) 502 (1940).
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"In so far as the two classes of stock were to be valued as income producing property with reasonable security for payment,
the prior preferred would be preferable for the reason that the
dividends accumulated on such class of stock were to be paid in
full, prior to the payment of any dividends on the preferred stock.
The retention of the preferred stock carried the right to the accrued dividends, and the court cannot, from the facts shown, hold
appellant's loss arising from the retention of his old preferred
stock would be such that, to avoid serious financial loss, he was
compelled to exchange his stock for the prior preferred."114 ·
Since the liquidation value of the old stock was not changed, it seems
that aside from the loss of the conversion privilege, the alteration of the
old preferred was on paper only, and that the substance of the change
was less than in those cases in which the cumulative feature of the
old stock was removed.
Thus~ in five cases the courts have held that the alteration of the
old preferred stockin such a way as to put pressure on a dissenter is
not an improper use of the amending power. Three of the <;ases may be
questioned since they involved Delaware corporations and were not
decided by the Delaware court,115 and the fourth case contains some indication that if the change were more than formal the court would
consider enjoining part of the amendment at least. However, on the
whole, the case law at this time indicates that such amendments are
perfectly proper exercises of the power of the majority.

(e) Release of Accrued Dividends For a Consideration. 116 If a
corporation finds it impossible or inconvenient to pay accrued dividends, and yet wishes to reduce or eliminate them, it may offer some
other security in exchange for them. If it could compel the exchange
of the arrearages for a new issue of stock equal or prior to the old
preferred stock itself, the accruals, being wiped out on the books,
would no longer call attention to the failure to pay dividends, the preferred stockholders would retain their priority over the common stock,
and yet the prospect of resuming dividends on the common shares
would be enhanced because the accrued dividends would not have to
be paid in cash first. But no such amendments have been found in the
reports, perhaps an indication that they have been satisfactory to all
parties, and perhaps a consequence of the unwillingness of common
114 Id. at 370-1.
115 But it seems

that these decisions would probably be approved by the Delaware
courts. See the Morris case, discu'ssed in note 105 supra.
116 See generally, comment, 9 DUKB B.A.J. 76 (1941).
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stockholders to vote for them. The only objection to such a plan would
be that cash payment of dividends on the preferred stock was being
deferred in favor of current dividends on the common stock. The
question would be whether this injury, slight in comparison to that
inflicted by a voluntary amendment which eliminates arrearages, is
outweighed by the advantages of the amendment to the corporation
and those interested in it.
Much the same question would be raised by an amendment which
proposed a voluntary exchange of accrued dividends for a senior or
equal security. The dissenters' only objection would be that other members of their class were moving ahead of them, so that they could maintain an equal position only by accepting the substitution and giving up
their chance of cash payment. In the only case raising the question,
the court avoided a decision. In Wilcox 11. The Trenton Potteries
Co.,117 the corporation proposed to issue "funding certificates" for accrued dividends, bearing "interest" at 4% when earned. The preferred
shares were to be exchanged for non-cumulative stock also, but this
seems to have played no part in the decision. The plan provided that
the interest should be payable "in priority to any dividend on the capital stock for such year." This would appear to mean that those who
accepted the certificates would be paid 4% on them before the dissenters would receive anything. The court, however, held that the amendment did not mean that "interest" could be paid to those giving consent, without paying dividends to the dissenters, and that if any attempt
were made by the corporation to construe it otherwise, the plaintiff
could maintain an action for relief. The construction of the plan seems
strained, perhaps indicating that the court would not have sustained
it if any priority had been given to the consenting stockholders. It
seems, however, that in the light of the previous cases the majority of
courts would permit the substitution of a security having priority over
the old preferred and its dividends, so long as the majority had power
to create a prior stock.
If the new security is inferior to the old shares and their dividends,
it seems that the dissenters could make no objection because the consenting members of the class would be moving behind them instead of
ahead. This problem was presented in Thomas v. Laconia Car Co.,118
in which the corporation proposed to issue one share of no par second
preferred, entitled to a $3.50 dividend when earned, in lieu of $70 accrued dividends on each share. The plaintiff dissented and sued to enm 64 N.J.Eq. 173, 53 A. 474 (Ch. 1902).
118 251

Mass. 529, 146 N.E. 775 (1925).
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join the plan and to recover her accrued dividends in cash. The court
refused relief on the ground that the issue of the new stock would not
interfere with the plaintiff's dividend or liquidation rights. As matters turned out, the dissenters had the better of it, for the corporation
later dissolved, and the court held, in Willson v. Laconia Car Co.,119
that the dissenters were to be paid par and all accrued dividends, while
those who had released their dividends in order to get the second preferred stock could only collect par and the dividends which had accrued since, the assets being insufficient to pay the par value of the
preferred stock. These are the only cases found which involved the
simple replacement of accrued dividends with other securities, without
also altering other rights of the shares.
Only three other cases have been found in which specific securities were offered for the accrued dividends, and these differ from the
former in that the exchange was accompanied by exchange of shares
or other changes in the old preferred stock. In the first of these, McKenzie v. Guaranteed Bond & Mortgage Co.,1 20 the amendment proposed that a new preferred be issued share for share for the old, and
that a "certificate" be issued for the accrued dividends and carried as a
credit to the _stockholders on the books. The legal traits of this certificate were not described. The court restrained the entire amendment,
but on the ground that the majority had no power to increase the capital. Hence the case would be of no value in the great majority of
states where such power exists. The second case, Johnson v. Bradley
Knitting Co.,1 21 did not involve an issue of new stock, but the amendment altered the dividend rate and sinking fund requirements of the
old stock, reduced the quick assets provision, and proposed to issue for
the accrued dividends a warrant convertible into one and one-fourth
shares of common stock. The acceptance of the warrant was optional.
The court sustained the rest of the amendment, but held that the plaintiff should be paid his accrued dividends in cash. It is not clear to what
extent the court relied upon the corporation's concession of the plaintiff's right to cash in reaching this result. It may have been influenced
by the thought that the only other remedy would be to enjoin the
issue of the warrants, which would have been unfortunate since the
corporation and the other stockholders approved. In the last case, Ainsworth v. Southwestern Drug Corp.,1 22 the amendment permitted the
119275 Mass. 435, 176 N.E. 182 (1931).
120 168 Ga. 145, 147 S.E. 102 (1929).
121 228 Wis. 566, 280 N.W. 688 (1938). For discussion, see comments: 6 Umv.
Cm. L. Rav. 104 (1938); 1943 Wxs. L. Rav. 417.
122 (5th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 172.
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old preferred. stockholders to keep their shares without change or to
exchange them for a new prior preferred. Stockholders who exchanged.
were given an income dividend note with interest at 3% for their accrued dividends. Since the other characteristics of the note were not
described., the only clear advantage that this gave the consenting stockholders was the interest. The federal court sustained the amendment
under the Texas statutes.
This group of cases raises the question whether a corporation which
has no power to remove accrued dividends could, by offering a specific
security for them, persuade a court to sustain a compulsory amendment
which it otherwise would hold illegal. Only two cases have been found
in which this has been attempted and in both it was unsuccessful. The
amendment in Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills1 23 compelled exchange of the old stock for a new class, and of the accrued dividends
for two shares of common stock. The court, holding the amendment
illegal, said:

"If the proposed amendment to the charter were such as to
offer reasonable protection to plaintiff's vested right in a mere
change of form which would not render it less secure, as, for example, the offer of income dividend notes as was done in Ainsworth
v. Southwestern Drug Corp., ... much of the legal objection might
be removed. In fact, the position of the stockholder with reference to his accrued dividends would be actually improved, since
dividends are not the debt of the corporation until declared; . . .
but we do not consider that the alternative offered plaintiffs is a
free choice or that it preserves their right. They have the choice of
accepting in exchange for their accumulated dividends shares of
the not-so-attractive common stock, or of standing aloof and seeing
their stock displaced by a new issue, upon which the corporation
intends to pay dividends in contravention of the vested prior rights
of the plaintiffs."124
Again, in Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co.,1 25 the amendment
gave one share of common stock for the accrued dividends; the court
held the amendment invalid. Hence, it seems that a compulsory exchange of a junior security for accrued dividends will not be sustained
if there is no ·power to take the arrearages away directly.
In many of the cases it is implicit that part of the new stock is
given in exchange for the accrued dividends on the old stock, but no
123 214

N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939).

124 Id. at 812.
121> 61 Ohio App.

1, 22 N.E. (2d) 281 (1939).
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express consideration -for the accrued dividends is stated. In such cases
the court, if it holds the amendment valid except for the accrued dividends, will require the plaintiff to exchange, but will have difficulty in
deciding how much of the exchange stock he is entitled to, since he is
not, like the assenting stockholders, surrendering his accrued dividends.
In the one case which discusses this problem; Dunn v. Wilson·& Co.,1 26
the amendment converted each share of old preferred into five shares of
common. Although the cancellation of accrued dividends was held
invalid, the court held that the other changes were proper and required
the plaintiff to exchange his old stock. The corporation then objected
that the five shares of common stock into which the preferred was converted included an allowance for accrued dividends, and that the plaintiff therefore should be made to take something less since he was to be
paid the accruals in cash. The court held that the defendant was not
in a position to raise a problem so difficult of solution:
"... Such a consideration may have been given to the amount
of common stock the Class A shareholders should receive to compensate them for their accrued dividends, and the distribution in
its larger aspects may be fair. But, this is all wide of the mark for
the particular plan agreed upon is illegal as to dissenting shareholders. They are entitled to their accrued dividends before anything is paid to common. If this operates to disrupt the nice distribution under the plan, it is merely the price which must be paid
for effecting an illegal plan. Neither the defendant who perfected
the illegal plan, nor the shareholders who assented to it, have a
standing to complain because the dissenting shareholders demand
their full rights under the statute."127
It is submitted that this disposition of the question is punitive, but
properly so. The court might well decline to enter upon a difficult task
of valuation which was made necessary by the failure of the plan to
express any concrete consideration for the surrender of the accrued
dividends. However, under the Harbine case, if the plan does state
what part of the exchange is for accrued dividends and if that part is
conveniently severable from the rest, it seems proper to limit the plaintiff to the consideration for his shares alone.
In numerous other cases, in deciding the question whether the plan
is "fair" the courts have attempted to weigh the value of the old securities against the value of the new ones.128 Such attempts rest on assump120 (D.C. Del. 1943) 53
121 Id. at 208.
128 As examples of such

F. Supp. 205.

attempts the following authoritie,s engage in comparison of
the earning power and relative priorities of the old and new securities: Shanik v. White
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tions concerning the volume of future business, estimates of costs, and
other indeterminate factors. But this method, whatever it may do in the
future, does not seem as yet to have affected the results of cases dealing
with accrued dividends. When the plan is "voluntary," that is, when
the old shares and their accrued dividends are left in being, the courts
have sustained the amendments, finding the plan fair if they consider
the question at all. When the plan is compulsory and there is no power
to remove accrued dividends, no case has been found which sustained
the amendment merely because something else was given which the
court found "fair." Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that
the cases would have been decided differently if the amendment had
not appeared to give control, or participation in dividends with the common, or some other consideration. It seems then, that such amendments only give a pretext for sustaining changes which the courts
would sustain without pretext.
(f) Elimination of Accrued Dividends by Merger, Consolidation,
and Sale of All Assets. The technique most recently developed for
avoiding the payment of accrued dividends uses the merger, consolidation, or sale of all assets. After the decisions in the Keller1 29 and the
Consolidated Film130 cases, the Delaware courts were presented with the
litigation in Federal United Corp. v. HavenderP 1 The plaintiff held
preferred stock on which there were $29 of accru_ed dividends. The
corporation merged with a wholly owned subsidiary, and reclassified its
Sewing Machine Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A. (2d) 831 (Sup. 1941), affirming (Del.
Ch. 1940) 15 A. (2d) 169; Matter of Woodruff, 175 Misc. 819, 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 679
(1941), affd. without opinion, 262 App. Div. 814, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 756 (1941); McQuillen
v. National Cash Register Co., (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 877, affirming (D.C. Md.
1939) 27 F. Supp. 639; Johnson v. Fuller, (3d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 618, affirming
(D.C. Pa. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 744, cert. den. 314 U.S. 681 (1941); Sander v. Janssen
Dairy Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 512. [This amendment was later held invalid
in Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 134 N.J.Eq. 359, 35 A. (2d) 894 (Ct. Err. & App.
1944)); United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell, (6th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 923.
McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., supra, and Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp.,
(D.C. Del. 1944) 53 F. Supp. 198, affd. (3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 701, indicate that
the loss of the common stock's voting control to the preferred, or the fact that the votes
of the common stock are necessary to carry the amendment, are entitled to weight in
appraising the "fairness" of the plan. Naturally, with such speculations, the preferred
stockholder's relatively determinate right to dividends over the common stock is being
transformed into something that may or may not be worth as much. The method, however,
as indicated above, has not been used to sustain any amendment which would not probably
have been sustained without it.
120 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (Sup. 1936).
1so 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489 (Sup. 1937).
1 81 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. (2d) 331 (Sup. 1940). See comments: 9 Dmrn B.A.J.
38 (1941); 39 Mi:CH. L. REv. 1201 (1941); 24 MrnN. L. REv. 992 (1940); 25 WASH.
Umv. L.Q. 614 (1940); and 53 HARv. L. REv. 877 (1940).

574

M:rcmGAN

LA.w REvmw

[ Vol. 49

stock in the process, giving for each share of old preferred stock one
share of new preferred with a lower dividend rate and six shares of class
A common stock. Two chancellors in the lower court held that there
could be no payment of dividends on the common stock of the resulting
corporation until the accrued dividends had been discharged.132 The
Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that the merger was legal
and that the plaintiff would have to make the exchange without receiving payment of his accrued dividends. This was equivalent in effect to
sustaining a compulsory amendment eliminating accrued dividends.
The basis of the court's decision was that statutes in force when the
corporation was chartered provid~d that the consolidation agreement
should state"... the manner of converting the shares of each of the
constituent corporations into shares of the consolidated corporations...."183 Distinguishing the Keller case, the court said:
" ... The decision has no application beyond its philosophy.
It has no bearing on the question in dispute. The substantial elements of the merger and consolidation provisions of the General
Corporation Law as they now appear have existed from the time
of the inception of the law.... The shareholder has notice that
the corporation whose shares he has acquired may be merged with
another corporation if the required majority of the shareholders
agree. He is informed that the merger agreement may prescribe
the terms and conditions of the merger, the mode of carrying it into effect, and the manner of converting the shares of the constituent .corporations into the shares of the resulting corporation. A
well understood meaning of the word 'convert,' is to alter in form,
substance or quality."134
The court also relied on the fact that the plaintiff was entitled to an appraisal in which he could recover in cash the full value of his shares.
As a matter of constitutional law the decision is clearly distinguishable from the Keller case, in which the only statute that could authorize
the amendment was subsequent to the charter. The statute relied on
to sustain the merger in the Havender case was in force when the com182 Jn the first opinion in the lower court the Chancellor doubted that dividends on
the new preferred stock could be enjoined, but enjoined them as to the common stock.
23 Del. Ch. 104, 2 A. (2d) 143 (Ch. 1938). After the death of the first Chancellor,
another enjoined dividends on the new preferred stock as well as the common. 24 Del.
Ch. 96, 6 A. (2d) 618 (Ch. 1939). In this he seems to have gone beyond the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Delaware. See discussion in Part I of this article, 49 MicH. L.
Rllv. 363 at 389-391 (1951) •.There is a comment on the decision of the lower court in
38 Mi:cH. L. Rllv. 214 (1939).
133 24 Del. Ch. 318 at 327, 11 A. (2d) 331 (1940).
134 Id. at 333-4.
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pany was chartered, and it is accepted law that what is done under such
a statute, whatever else may be wrong with it, does not violate the contracts clause.131s The construction of the statute as authorizing the r~
moval of accrued dividends is more difficult to justify. The court had
twice held that the " ... preferences, or relative participating, option or
other special rights of the shares . . ." did not include accrued dividends.136 Its decision that a power to state the "... manner of converting the shares ..." does include them is singularly unconvincing as
a matter of English. However, once this linguistic peculiarity is accepted, the Havender case is understandable. Since the merger provisions
contemplate a complete change of the securities of one corporation into
those of another, and since the lack of power to affect accrued dividends might otherwise prevent desirable mergers, a respectable case
can be made for the broad construction on policy grounds. These considerations, however, are eliminated by the facts of the case. The
merger was with a wholly-owned subsidiary; the same directors were in
charge of both parties, and so there was no need for affecting the securities of the parent. The court applied to the statute the same principles
of construction that it has applied to the power to issue prior stock, that
185 The principle is abundantly established by nearly all the cases sustaining amendments. There is, however, this dictum in the Hottenstein case, discussed infra p. 576 ff.,
at note 139: "A court of the United States bound by the rule of Erle R. Co. v. Tompkins
is powerless to afford aid to the stockholder until reclassification reaches that degree of
unfairness where it amounts to a cancellation of the preferred stockholders' accumulated
unpaid dividends without adequate compensation therefor under the law, either by way
of a share in the equity of the surviving corporation or by the payment of money under
Section 61 of the General Corporation Law. At such a point a court of the United States
might grant injunctive relief under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." 136 F.
(2d) at 953. Professor Dodd suggests that the appraisal provision would prevent successful
attack by the stockholder on due process grounds in the case before the court, but that in
amendment cases, when there is no appraisal provision, the attack might succeed. "Accrued
Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From Vested Right to Mirage," 57 HARv. L. Rnv.
894 at 898 (1944).
It is true that the federal district court, in Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel
Corp., (D.C. R.I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533, considered hypothetically whether a state statute
reserving the right to alter or amend all contracts thereafter entered into would permit it
thereafter to avoid the operation of the contracts clause, and indicated that it would not.
But the decision, so far as relevant, merely held unconstitutional an attempt to remove a
sinking fund provision for the benefit of the preferred stock, under a statute subsequent to
the charter. There is also a suggestion in Pronick v. Spirits Distributing Co., 58 N.J.Eq.
97, 42 A. 586 (Ch. 1899), that permitting alteration of the dividend rate under a general
power to amend the charter would impair the obligation of contracts. These are the only
, statements found which seem to question the position taken in the text, and in view of the
mass of cases which proceed on the other assumption it seems impossible to attribute much
weight to them. Moreover, one of the dicta refers to the general power reserved by the state
to amend charters and the other to a very general power to amend the charter, which are
both distinguishable from a specific power reserved to do the very thing complained of.
136 In the Keller case, 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (Sup. 1936), and the Consolidated
Film case, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489 (Sup. 1937).
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is, that if the merger is verbally justi.6.ed by the statutes, no collateral
effects that it may have can be considered.137 For these reasons the decision has proved a misfortune. ,
Whatever the merits of the Havender case, it opened a highway
around the Keller and Consolidated Film cases which others were not
slow to use. 138 In Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp.,1 39 the
subsidiary was created solely for the purpose of the merger, which was
carried through by giving for each share of old preferred with its $88.25
accrued dividends, 15 shares of preferred in the new corporation. The
federal court sustained the merger, holding that under the Havender
case the fact that the subsidiary was formed for the purpose of the union
was immaterial. Its comment on the Havender case is interesting:

"... If it is fair to say that the decision of the Supreme Court
of Delaware in the Keller case astonished the corporate world, it is
just to state that the decision of the Supreme Court in Havender
astounded it, for shorn of rationalization the decision constitutes
a repudiation of principles enunciated in the ~eller case and in
Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, supra."140
In Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, Inc.,1 41 the same circuit
court of appeals sustained a merger with a subsidiary which converted
each share of preferred with $88.67 accrued dividends into one share
of new preferred and .6.ve shares of new common, holding that even a
charter provision that the pre.ferred should receive l IO%·of any reduc1s1 See comment in 53 HARv. L. R.Ev. 877 at 878 (1940) and note, 38 Mi:CH. L. R.Ev.
214 at 218 (1939). See also Meck, "Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stock:
The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARv. L. R.Ev. 71 at 93 (1941).
138 The ground was, perhaps, slightly broken earlier. The court sustained a merger
ip Macfarlane ,v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 A. 396 (Ch.
1928), commented on- in 45 HARV. L. R.Ev. 929 (1932), in spite of an adverse effect on
accrued dividends, but it did not particularly consider them in its decision. Some years
before the Havender case, the federal court sustained a sale of all assets in which the old
preferred received eight-tenths of a share of new preferred for the old stock and its accrued
dividends. The court stated generally that it considered that the plan was permitted by
the Delaware law, and that_it was fair. United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell, (6th Cir.
1935) 75 F. (2d) 923.
At about the time of the Havender case, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held, with
respect to a Delaware corporation, that a sale of all assets matured the liquidation provisions
of the preferred stock, and that the plaintiff could recover par and accrued dividends.
Graham v. New Mexico Eastern Gas Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 141 S.W. (2d) 389.
130 (3d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 944, affirming (D.C. Del. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 436;
bill of review den. (3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 835, cert. den. 325 U.S. 886 (1945),
For a discussion of the lower court's decision see comment, 43 CoL. L.,R.Ev. 230 (1943)
( very critical).
140 136 F. (2d) 944 at 950.
141 (3d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 804, affirming (D.C. Del. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 209.
Accord: National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior University, (9th Cir. 1943) 134
F. (2d) 689, reversing (D.C. Cal. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 389, cert. den. 320 U.S. 773 (1943).
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tion in capital plus its accrued dividends to the date of the reduction
did not prevent the merger. Hence the federal courts, though critical,
have completely enforced the rule of the Havender case.142
In New York one lower court has reached the same result. In Zobel
v. American Locomotive Co.,1 43 the corporation merged with two wholly owned subsidiaries, giving one share of new preferred, one and th:i:eefourths shares of new common, and $7 in cash for each share of old
preferred with its $42.75 of accrued dividends. The purpose of the
merger was frankly acknowledged to be the elimination of the arrearages. In sustaining the merger the court said:
·
"... The existence of a large amount of unpaid cumulative
dividends well may be, and in many instances is, detrimental to the
best interests of a company, and no showing is here made which
enables the court to say that that is not true in this case. Furthermore, the preferred stockholders' present right to the accumulated
arrears is not being taken from them without a consideration moving directly to them individually and collectively. Speaking broadly and in terms of practical results, they are being given, in exchange for that right and such other rights as pertain to their
present shares, approximately one-sfath of the accumulated arrears
of dividends in cash and an additional stock interest in the consolidated company so substantial as to change them collectively from
the position of minority to the position of majority stockholders.
Whether they will be better off as minority stockholders in a corporation having an immense amount of unpaid cumulative dividends or as majority stockholders in a corporation having no unpaid cumulative dividends is a question of business judgment. It
142 The lower courts in Delaware have also carried out the principles of the Havender
case, without qualification. In Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A. (2d)
148 (Ch. 1943), commented on in 42 MlcH. L. REv. 332 (1943), the corporation merged
with a wholly owned subsidiary when the balance sheet showed assets worth less than the
par value and accrued dividends to which the preferred was entitled on liquidation. Each
preferred share was converted into one share of new preferred with lower liquidation value
and dividends, and five shares of new common. Each share of old common was converted
into one tenth of a share of new. The court held that the plaintiff's claims of unfairness
could not be sustained. Since the corporation was not being liquidated, it was not correct
to measure the rights of the stockholders by the liquidation preferences of the senior stock.
The' argument of the plaintiff was also said to overlook the fact that the common was
losing voting control, while the preferred was gaining in pre-emptive rights, and sinking
fund, and conversion privileges. But the court's description of these gains as " ••• changes
which may be of substantial value, depending upon future events," [27 Del. Ch. 127 at
134, 32 A. (2d) 148 (1943)] correctly describes the uncertainties with which the courts
and the parties are dealing in these cases. See Dodd, "Accrued Dividends in Delaware
Corporations-From Vested Rights to Mirage,'' 57 HAnv. L. REv. 894 at 895-6 (1944), for
strong criticism of this case.
143 182 Misc. 323, 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 33 (1943).
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certainly is not a question which a court can attempt to decide for
them. The sole question for the court is whether or not the proposal is violative of their legal rights."144
The court's putting the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the
accrued dividends were not a burden on the corporation, has been
discussed previously.145 The statement that the question is one of ''business judgment" and so outside the scope of judicial review, seems to
overlook the shifting of property interests which resulted from the
amendment.146 The court of appeals, in Anderson 11. International
Minerals & Chemical Corp.,147 sustaining a merger in which the preferred with accrued dividends was converted into one share of new preferred and three and one-half shares of new common, while the old
common received one-fourth share of new common for each share <;>f
old, put its decision on the terms of the merger statute:

"In this case we are dealing with the provisions of the New
York Stock Corporation Law having to do with merger and consolidation. . .· . These provisions differ in language, purpose and
subject matter from article 4 relating to the reclassification of
shares under which the cases arose upon which plaintiff relies.
The whole process of merger and consolidation rests upon the
principle of permitting consolidations approved by two-thirds of
the shareholders which in the absence of statute would require
the consent of all and permitting dissenters, not wishing to go
along, the opportunity to have their shares appraised and to retire
from the enterprise upon payment to them of the appraised value
of their shares."148
But this merger was between two independent companies, and the decision does not necessarily imply approval of the Havender case.
In New Jersey the courts, after a doubtful beginning, have reached
the same result as in Delaware and New York. In Colgate v. U. S.
Leather Co.149 the plan of consolidation of the subsidiary, in which the
plaintiff held preferred stock, but which was almost wholly owned by
144 Id. at 325.
145 See Part I of this article, 49
146 The refusal of the courts to

Mxca. L. R:Ev. 363 at 371-372 (1951).
pass upon some amendment questions on the ground
that they present merely problems of business judgment is examined and criticized at
greater length in another article of this series, entitled: "Corporate Charter Amendments:
Issues of Prior Stock, and the Alteration of Dividend Rates," 50 CoL. L. R:Ev. 900 (1950).
147 295 N.Y. 343, 67 N.E. (2d) 573 (1946). Accord: In re Interborough Consolidated
Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 277 F. 455.
148 295 N.Y. 343 at 349, 67 N.E. (2d) 573 (1946).
149 73 N.J.Eq. 72, 67 A. 657 (Ch. 1907), affd. 75 N.J.Eq. 229, 72 A. 126 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1909).
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the other company, gave a five percent gold bond for $50, a $50 par
share of new preferred and $23.50 of common stock, for each share of
old preferred with its accrued dividends. Each share of old common
received three-tenths of a share of new. There were about 45.8% of
accrued dividends on the old preferred. The applicable statute provided
that the plan should set out"... the manner of converting the capital
stock ..."; the lower court held that this did not permit conversion of
accrued dividends because the latter were a debt or liability of the company, saved by another section of the statute. The Delaware and New
York courts have rejected similar arguments under their statutes.150
The affirrnance of the Colgate case by the Court of Errors and Appeals
was on other grounds and cannot be taken as an approval of the lower
court's decision on this point.151 Many years later, in Windhurst v.
Central Leather Co.,1 52 in which it appears that the corporations were
independent, both courts took the opposite view. The consolidation
plan gave the old preferred half a share of new preferred, three-fourths
of a share of a subordinate participating preferred and $5, in discharge
of each old share and its 43% of accrued dividends. The lower court
sustained the merger, partly on the ground that this treatment of the preferred stock was equitable and within the power of the corporation, and
partly on the ground qf laches.153 The cases can be reconciled on the
ground that the first involved a parent-subsidiary merger while the
second did not, but the opinions certainly do not rest on such reasoning.
The plaintiffs in the Windhurst case also claimed that the merger
amounted to a dissolution which entitled the preferred stockholder un150 The Delaware court held in the Havender case that accrued dividends did not
make a stockholder a creditor, and that the words, "debts" and ''liabilities" in the merger
act, from the context, referred to " ••• persons external to the corporation..••" 24 Del.
Ch. 318 at 336, 11 A. (2d) 331 (1940). The New York Court of Appeals held that
accrued dividends did not survive a merger or consolidation as a debt, in Anderson v.
International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 67 N.E. (2d) 573 (1946).
151 After the opinion in the lower court, the corporation altered the plan so that it did
not affect accrued dividends. The court of errors and appeals nevertheless enjoined the
merger on the ground that there was no power to carry it out. 75 N.J.Eq. 229, 72 A. 126
(Ct. Err. & App. 1909).
It should be noted that the lower court in the Colgate case said that the $23.50 of
common stock was not stated to be in exchange for the accrued dividends, but that both
sides had acted as if it were. It then held that the exchange of common stock for accrued
dividends was only an offer, which the stockholder had the power to reject.
152 101 N.J.Eq. 543, 138 A. 772 (Ch. 1927), and 105 N.J.Eq. 621, 149 A. 36 (Ch.
1930), affd. 107 N.J.Eq. 528, 153 A. 402 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931). The reasoning is taken
from the lower court opinions as the affirmance is practically in the terms of those opinions.
153 In Clarke v. Gold Dust Corp., (3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 598, cert. den., 309
U.S. 671 (1940) the federal court sustained a merger of New Jersey corporations in a way
which would be in accordance with the Windhurst case, but it is not clear from the discussion whether there were accrued dividends or not.
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der the charter to payment in cash of the par value and accrued dividends. The court held that merger was not a dissolution. But this contention seems to have been successful in Ohio. In Geiger v. American
Seeding Machine Co.,1 54 upon a sale of all assets, the court held that
the plan of distribution set forth in the sale could not displace the preferred stockholders' rights to par and accrued dividends before the common stock received anything. The statutes provided for appraisal of
dissenters' shares upon sales of all assets, but the court held that appraisal was the remedy only if the stockholder objected to the sale,
not if he merely objected to the terms of distribution of the proceeds.
The Ohio law was afterwards altered by statute on this point.155 The
Pennsylvania court has also held that a merger amounted to a dissolution, entitling the preferred stockholders to par and accrued dividends
before anything was paid to the common stock.156 Again, however, it
seems that subsequent statutes have altered the law. In Hubbard il.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,1 57 the merger ( with two wholly owned
subsidiaries) provided that each old share should be converted into
one-half share of each of two new types of preferred and one and onefourth shares of common. The federal court sustained the merger as a
fair exercise of the power to convert the shares and held that a statute
subsequent to the earlier case made appraisal the exclusive remedy for
dissenters. The Virginia court has held that appraisal is not the exclusive remedy in sale of all assets, but that it is in case of merger, so that
by merger a corporation can rid itself of accrued dividends.158
154124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N.E. 594 (1931).
155 See Daus v. Otis Steel Co., 11 Ohio Supp. 94 (Common Pleas 1942).
150 Petry v. Harwood Electric Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 A. 302 (1924); companion case,
280 Pa. 158, 124 A. 307 (1924).
157 (D.C. Pa. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 432.
158 In Powell v. Craddock-Terry Co., 175 Va. 146, 7 S.E. (2d) 143 (1940), the
court held as a matter of construction, that the plaintiff was entitled on dissolution only
to the par value of his stock, but not to accrued dividends. In Craddock-Terry Co. v.
Powell, 180 Va. 242, 22 S.E. (2d) 30 (1942), the court held against vigorous dissent
that a sale of all assests was not a dissolution, and that the plaintiff, a preferred stockholder, could not maintain an action for the par value of his stock under the dissolution
provisions of the charter, but only an action for statutory appraisal. Then, in the same case
on rehearing, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E. (2d) 363 (1943), the court held in accordance with
the previous dissent, that the sale was a liquidation, and that the plaintiff was entitled
to the par value of his shares, instead of the value that might be set in an appraisal. Since
it had been held as a matter of construction that the plaintiff was not entitled to accrued
dividends on liquidation, they could not be recovered, but it seems clear that they could
have been if the charter had provided for them.
Subsequently, in Adams v. U.S. Distributing Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E. (2d)
244 (1945), the plaintiff held preferred stock in a Virginia corporation which merged with a
Delaware corporation, and claimed that the merger amounted to a dissolution which entitled
him under the Craddock case to par and accrued dividends on his shares. The court held
that appraisal was the exclusive remedy in cases of merger and distinguished the Craddock
case on the ground that it was a sale of all assets, and governed by different statutes.
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Thus, it seems that in every state159 that has dealt with the problem
merger offers a compulsory means of eliminating accrued dividends, decisions to the contrary being quickly changed by statute. It seems queer
to protect accrued dividends from amendment while the equally easy
method of merger is left open. Explanations based on the appraisal
statutes and on the argument that accrued dividends would otherwise
bar financially desirable mergers do not ring true when a subsidiary corporation is used for the operation.

4. Summary
The law of accrued dividends may be summarized as follows:
(a) Direct removal of accrued dividends is legal when the statutes
expressly permit it, describing them by that name, provided the lower
court decisions upholding the statutes in New Jersey and New York
are approved by their respective appellate courts. Aside from this, direct
removal is allowed in Maryland if the state courts there follow the federal interpretation of the statutes, and it seems likely that Illinois will
also permit direct removal by corporations chartered under the Business Corporations Act of 1933. VVith these exceptions, direct removal
of accrued dividends is not allowed.
(b) The constitutionality of subsequent statutes authorizing removal of accrued dividends has not been settled; the decisions in New
York and Delaware are in conllict and no decisions of the Supreme
Court are sufficiently in point to warrant prediction of what it would do.
159 Except

possibly Missouri and Massachusetts. See Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric

Co., (8th Cir. 1906) 144 F. 765, and Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 556, 159 N.E. 70
(1927) (sale of all assets).
A recent decision by the Illinois Appellate Court suggests that Illinois may not follow
the trend elsewhere. In Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Co., 335 ill. App. 402, 82 N.E.
(2d) 184 (1948), the corporation had $100 par value preferred stock, with a 6½%
cumulative dividend, and a liquidation preference of par and accrued dividends. By the
requisite vote of the stockholders, all the assets of the company were sold to the city of
Quincy. Some of the common stockholders received $5 per share from the corporation.
The plaintiffs got nothing for their preferred stock and its $104.99 of accrued dividends,
but were offered $150 per share under the sale contract. The plaintiffs brought an action
in equity, demanding the payment of $204.99 per share out of money on deposit to the
corporation's credit. The court, reversing the trial judge, held that the complaint stated
a cause of action. The plaintiff was not limited to appraisal, it held, if the sale were fraudulent and illegal as alleged, and the payments to the common stockholders would support
those allegations if proved. These payments, it is submitted, would have justified the court
without more, but the court went on to review some of the cases in other jurisdictions,
and stated that the sale of all assets statute in Illinois did not permit distribution of the
proceeds on a basis different from the provisions of the charter and the Corporation Act.
The court concluded that if the illinois legislature had meant to permit elimination of ac-crued dividends it would have stated its intention expressly. The case is doubtful authority,
at least on the last point, in view of Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, discussed in Part I
of this article, 49 MxcH. L. REv. 363 at 369 (1951).
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( c) Indirect removal of accrued dividends by issuing prior stock
and making other alterations damaging to the dissenting old stockholders are sustained in most sta~es, and in those 4iat do not approve
the remedies of the dissenter are not very effective, except, perhaps, in
New Jersey and North Carolina.
(d) Mergers and consolidations, even if arranged with a subsidiary for the purpose of eliminating accrued dividends, will accomplish
compulsory removal in most states that have passed on the question,
and where the courts have held that they will not, the legislatures have
been prompt to change the rule as far as they could by statute.
(e) Offers of other securities for accrued dividends do not seem to
affect the results of the cases ..
(f) Plans which offer securities partly for the old stock and partly
for accrued dividends without indicating what is for the dividends, are
sustained if they are voluntary in form and rejected if they are compulsory, that is, the results of these cases are the same as those in which
no express provision is made for accrued dividends. Thus, though some
of the cases contain the possibility that a fair plan was offered, and although some of the courts have considered the "fairness" of such plans,
it is impossible to say that the results have actually turned on fairness.
The rules, therefore, after the recent B.ood of cases, remain just
what they were in the beginning, except that merger has developed into
the most successful direct attack on accrued dividends - so successful
that it is perhaps foolish to use any other. The law has reached this condition without a single convincing demonstration in any case of the facts
that justify such interference with the property rights of the minority.
The state of the cases ·suggests that judicial and perhaps statutory remedy is needed.

5. Conclusions
I have attempted to show at the beginning of this article that accrued dividends are not qualitatively different from other rights of the
preferred stockholder, for example, his right to future dividends. The
right to accrued dividends arises from contract, and is subject to conditions beyond the personal control of the individual stockholder.
Hence it is illogical to distinguish accrued dividends as "vested" or
otherwise legally peculiar. On the other hand, it is a fact that accrued
dividends represent a measure of priority which the preferred stockholders are entitled to against the common stock, and this priority,
which may ultimately be translated into a money return, is one of the
things that induced the investor to buy that stock rather than common
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stock. Money return is what the preferences given to senior stock are
intended to protect; and money return is what the amendments attack
when they alter accrued dividends. If the facts justify alteration of accrued dividends the majority should be able to compel the minority in
the public interest. The lamentable inconsistency of the voluntary
amendment, which accomplishes the end by pressure, should be eliminated;160 nor .should it be necessary to resort to the complications of a
merger or sale of all assets to achieve a simple result, if the public interest requires that a change be made.
The public interest which is alleged to require alteration of accrued
dividends, meanwhile, is elusive. It appears only in general statements.
Upon the demand for concrete facts it dissolves. And if the assault upon these is successful, there is no reason why other preferences should
not also be subject to similar change. Under the voluntary plans and
mergers, it is as if every certificate of preferred stock bore on it the
legend: ''This stock is prior to all others, bears 7% cumulative dividends, has a liquidation preference of $110 and accrued dividends, and
is entitled to a sinking fund of $50,000 per year, unless a majority of
the class which you, as purchaser, have joined, should change its collective mind, in which case this stock is no better than second preferred
and perhaps worse, bears 1% divide:rids which are non-cumulative, has
no liquidation or sinking fund rights, and will lose all the dividends
that shall have been passed before the majority has made up its mind
to terminate your rights." Common sense would advise great caution
in entering into such a contract as this, particularly when the cases show
what things a majority of a class has often agreed to do to itself. Continuation of the present law, with the present temper of mind which
takes full advantage of it, may bring corporations to the place where
they cannot raise money on preferred stock and will have to rely on
common stock and debt financing. There is very real risk that cumulative preferred stock will cease to be a valuable investment, that
those who would otherwise buy it, will insist on a creditor's status which
at least puts them beyond reach of their fellows' mistakes.
The chance that preferred stock will be destroyed as an investment
device warrants closer consideration of the problems presented by the
160 It is seldom that the courts and the writers are so far apart on a question with both
sides so nearly unanimous. For criticism of voluntary plans on the ground that they are
really compulsory, see Dodd, ''Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 HARv. L. RBv. 780
at 807-8 (1942); Latty, ''Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination," 29 VA. L. RBv. 1 at 7, 20 (1942); see also notes: 52 HARv. L. RBv. 1331 at 1336-7
(1939); 55 HARv. L. RBv. 1196 at 1200 (1942); 33 ILL. L. RBv. 212 at 214 (1938); 4
Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 645 at 648 (1937).
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accrued dividend cases. If the risk of destruction is great, the public
interest may in the end be on the side of preserving it.
(a) The Constitutional Question. When the necessary effect of an
alteration of accrued dividends is to shift property interests, or to set
losses off against the senior instead of the junior securities, the action,
if authorized by a statute subsequent to the charter, should be held to
violate the due process and contracts clauses. It achieves an improper
end by unreasonable means. It is true that the presumption of constitutionality will probably sustain such general statutes as are now common, but this does not by any means conclude the question. The statutes
may stand as general enactments, but it is true at the same time that
they do not in themselves alter the capital structure of any corporation.
The power which the majority exercises in adopting amendments authorized by such statutes, comes in part at least, from the state, and is
consequently, a delegated power. The statutes contain no standards to
guide the majority in the exercise of the power, and the delegation,
moreover, is to a class of persons interested, perhaps adversely, in the
subject matter upon which the power is exerted. When the effect of
the majority action is to shift interests from one class to another, the
way is open to hold that the statute, though constitutional in itself, is
being unconstitutionally applied to the facts of the case.
In short, once the stockholder has shown that the effect of the
amendment is to shift property interests, the burden of proof should be
on the majority and the corporation to show that some overriding public interest requires that the amendment be made.161 This proof should
be concrete, on the facts of the individual case, and not some general
assertion that the state needs or might need the change and therefore
has the power to authorize all corporations to make it. Just as in eminent domain the condernnor has to show the public purpose in each action, so here, when property is taken, the majority should be required to
show that the amendment is necessary in the specific case.
It may be argued that the majority vote for the amendment shows
the need for it, and that by requiring such a vote the state automatically
limits amendments to cases of necessity. But those who have considered
the question outside of judicial proceedings universally denounce the
majority vote on the ground that it does not rest on any serious convictions of the need for the amendment. Proxy machinery, more than
161 For suggestions that the burden of justification should be on the majority see comment, 36 CoL. L. RBv. 674 at 675 (1936); it seems that Professor Latty's suggestions
would also include this: "Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination," 29 VA. L. R.Bv. I at 14, 50 (1942).
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anything else, produces the approval.1 62 Various arguments based upon
corporate need have been examined and found wanting. The presence
of accrued dividends, for example, is often said to prevent the corporation from borrowing money, but there is good evidence that they do not
prevent credit financing if the corporation is otherwise a sound risk;163
if it were not, the absence of accrued dividends would not help it. One
of the main supports for the amendments has been the claim that they
facilitate financing by common stock, but such financing has not in fact
followed the amendments. 164 The commonest assumption among the
writers is that the apparent reason for the amendment, the desire to pay
dividends on the common stock, is also the real one.165
162 On this point there is unanimity among the non-judicial writers. See Latty, "Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination," 29 VA. L. REv. 1 at
22-23 (1942); see also note, 36 CoL. L. REv. 674 at 675 (1936); comment, 25 CoRN. L.Q.
431 at 436 (1940); notes: 52 HARv. L. REv. 1331 at 1332 (1939); 54 HARv. L. REv.
488 at 489 (1941); 26 MINN. L. REv. 387 at 395 (1942); 4 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 645 at
653 (1937); 46 YALE L. J. 985 at 999 (1937).
163 See Latty, ''Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination,"
29 VA. L. REv. I at 12 (1942).
164 See Dodd, ''Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 HARv. L. REv. 780, esp. at
782-3 (1942).
Issuing stock prior to all the old classes for new cash or property seems unlikely to
succeed, since the common stock would probably not vote for a measure likely to diminish its
chances of dividends. Moreover, such plans would complicate the stock structure, and it
may not be sound policy to encourage them. See 4 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 645 at 655 (1937);
a note in 55 HARv. L. REv. 1196 at 1206 (1942) cites this complication of the stock structure as an argument against the voluntary plans.
I once suggested that limiting the power to issue prior stock to cases in which it was
issued for cash would enable the courts to defeat the voluntary plans. ''The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter Amendment," 40 CoL. L. REv. 633 at 648 (1940).
This suggestion has been criticized as academic. Meck, "Accrued Dividends on Cumulative
Preferred Stock: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV. L. REv. 71 at 95, note 80 (1941). If
construed as meaning that stock should not be issued for property, I quite agree. However, issuing it to other members of the plaintiff's class for their old shares is distinguishable
from issuing it for fresh consideration, whether cash or property, and it seems quite proper
for a court to enjoin any use of the power that achieves ends beyond the direct power of
the 'majority. The suggestion seems to be approved in note, 26 MINN. L. REv. 387
at 397 (1942). It is not different in nature from the numerous proposals that the merger
statutes should not be construed as permitting unions of parent and subsidiaries with the
purpose of eliminating accrued dividends.
165 The cases, notably those sustaining mergers of parent and subsidiacy, frequently
suggest that appraisal is an adequate remedy, and that if it is provided, there is no need
for other protection. But the decisions of the New York courts, denying appraisal when the
amendment is voluntary [see note 95 in Part I of this article, 49 M:rcH. L. REv. 363 at
392 (1951)], suggest that this remedy as applied by the courts is not adequate. Moreover, many of the writers on the subject have pointed out defects in the appraisal
procedure as it stands now, which make it objectionable even if the stockholder is
permitted to use it. See Lattin, "Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal
Statutes," 45 HARv. L. REv. 233 (1931); Levy, "Rights of Dissenting Stockholders
to Appraisal and Payment," 15 CoRN. L.Q. 420 (1930); see also Dodd, "Accrued
Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From Vested Right to Mirage," 57 HARv. L. REv.
894 at 895 (1944), and Dodd, "Amendment of Corporate Articles Under the New Ohio
General Corporation Act," 4 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 129 at 164-5 (1930), indicating the be-
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Finally, when considering the claims of a public interest in these
cases, it should be remembered that the corporation laws of a few
states control the corporations of the country. Delaware,· Maryland,
New Jersey and New York pass laws and their courts determine the
constitutional questions presented by them, so far with little guidance
from the Supreme Court. If the corporation's property is in another
state, and only a small proportion of the stock is held by residents of
Delaware," the public policy of the case and the constitutionality of the
action are being determined by a legislature and a court which have no
contact with the sovereign whose interests are really in issue. This is
an immense debit to be subtracted from the claim of public interest in
all of these cases. There is some hope that litigation undertaken in the
states where the corporations have property might have happier results, but the rule that courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of
foreign corporations, and perhaps. the crystallization of local µiterpretations under the full faith and credit clause may prevent successful
development along this line. l\1oreover, it is not unlikely that the enactment of broad amending statutes in other states results from following the corporation states, either blindly, or in an effort to keep local
corporations at home, rather than from serious convictions that those
powers are necessary to corporate enterprise.
In short, considering the drastic effects of these amendments· on
contracts and property, it seems that rigorous proof should be required
that the majority is serving some public interest when it adopts them.
The proof has not been forthcoming. Accordingly, though there is power to enact such legislation under the reserved power and perhaps under the police power as well, the exercise of such power should be carefully scrutinized, and the majority should be held to strict proof of the
necessity for the amendment, if it is found to shift property among the
classes.
·
The fear of hamstringing corporations by narrow constitutional interpretation should not prevent the application of this theory. The
power to enact the statutes is not denied; the legislation can be passed.
If the public interest justifies the application of it in a particular case,
presumably that interest can be proved, and it seems no more than reasonable to place the burden of that proof upon those who assert the
fact.
lief that a stockholder should not be forced to accept appraisal as the alternative to an
amendment that discriminates, and that it may not eliminate constitutional questions, unless
eminent domain would be available against the dissenter. See also notes: 36 CoL. L. RBv.
674 at 675 (1936); 52 HAnv. L. RBv. 1331 at 1334 (1939); 26 MINN. L. RBv. 387 at
397-9 (1942); 54 YALE L. J. 840 at 844-5 (1945).
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(b) Construction of Statutes in Force When the Charter is Grant-

ed. As liberal amending statutes become part of the corporation law in
more and more states, constitutional problems presented by subsequent
statutes are decreasing in importance. But even under existing statutes,
the minority does not necessarily lose all its constitutional objections.
Assuming that the conventional view is correct, that the minority has no
contracts clause objections to action taken under such statutes the corporate form of business is so essential, and corporate securities are so vital a form of investment, that a stockholder's freedom of contract and
property may be taken without due process when advance consent to
such actions is extracted as a condition of investment-unless, that is,
the corporation were able to establish a public interest in the amendment on the facts of the case. There is, however, very little authority for
. this position.166 The same technique could be applied to the powers to
issue prior stock and to classify and reclassify stock now so generally reserved; that is, the reservation of such powers, if interpreted to permit
the shifting of property without justification, could be held a violation
of due process.
A more promising approach, in view of the cases so far decided,
would be to urge that the statutes should not be interpreted as authorizing the shifting of property interests, whether they permit the issue
of prior stock, reclassification of old stock, or mergers and sales of all
assets. Another means to the same end is to hold ·that, as powers in
trust, the majority cannot use them to the advantage of one class and the
disadvantage of another.167 These methods would enable the courts to
control amendments, even under existing statutes, without the aid of
constitutional limitations.
A decision that an amendment on one or another of these grounds
is invalid, would be a poor victory for the dissenter, unless the relief
given to him were effective. The courts have a choice between enjoining the entire plan and three kinds of less drastic relief: (I) enjoining
dividends on the new stock until accrued and current dividends have
been paid on the old; (2) enjoining dividends on the new stock until
only the accrued dividends have been paid; (3) permitting dividends
on the new stock at once, and merely enjoining dividends on the common stock until the accrued dividends have been paid. If it is practical,
an injunction against the consummation of the plan is the best, espe166 What I have found is printed in note 135 supra.
167 See Berle, "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust,"

44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931).
See also, as a clear example of equitable limitations of amending powers, the cases on reduction of capital, cited in note 88 supra.
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cially since the majority might wish to withdraw when it finds that dissenters are not bound by it. But if the plan is already executed, the
rights of purchasers of all classes of shares after the amendment, and
before the decision would raise difficult problems. In such circumstances, it seems sufficient to give the old shares priority as to accrued
and future dividends over the new ones. Anything less than this seems
inadequate, since giving the new stock priority in current dividends
definitely puts a pressure on the dissenters. In cases of partial invalidity, it would be necessary to work out the relief to fit the individual
case, but if the decree eliminated pressure on dissenters to accept the
illegal part of the amendment, it would be sufficient.
(c) Methods of Control. The discussion thus far has been limited to the ways in which the courts could assume power to control
amendments. There have been a number of suggestions that the control be turned over to administrative bodies, at least as to amendments
that affect accrued dividends.168 Among these I would class my own
earlier suggestion that the statutes be drawn to require judicial approval
of the plan before it becomes effective.169 It seems, however, that both
of these methods would cause unnecessary trouble and expense. Very
possibly the volume of amendments in most states would not justify
the creation of a commission for that work, or even enlargement of the
powers of some existing commission. Requiring advance judicial approval would put a heavy burden on the courts, in many cases not justified because no stockholder may care to object to the plan. Neither system would be likely to do enough good to justify its expense. The inherent power of equity to enjoin plans or parts of plans upon the suit of
interested parties, seems to offer the least expensive system of relief.
It seems that the proposals to submit amendments to administrative
tribunals are open to another most serious objection.. As a matter of
actual fact, the great bulk of the cases would come before the commissions of a very few states, which would, in consequence, decide these
questions for the entire country, without much, if any, hope that they
168 These suggestions, as least as to amendments which affect accrued dividends, are
very common. See Dodd, "Fait and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 HARV. L. RBv. 780 at
811 ff. (1942); notes: 52 HARv. L. RBv. 1331 (1939); 26 M:rNN. L. RBv. 387 at 396
(1942); 4 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 645 at 657 (1937); 46 YALE L. J. 985 at 1003 (1937).
Some writers have preferred a more extensive judicial control of amendments to administrative procedure. See Latty, "Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage
Elimination," 29 VA. L. RBv. 1 at 50 (1942), suggesting that legislative action should be
taken only if the courts fail to solve the problem. See also note, 36 CoL. L. RBv. 674 at
676 (1936).
169 ''The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter Amendment," 40 CoL.
L. RBv. 633 at 650 (1940).
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were enforcing the public policy of the states whose property and citizens were involved. Moreover, within the same state there might be
gross differences between corporations, according to the state they had
selected for incorporating. These, I submit, are very strong objections
to the use of state administrative bodies. The only administrative
alternative, however, would be to vest the power for the whole country
in the S. E. C., or some other federal body. Control of this sort might
be constitutional under the reasoning which sustained the Securities
and Exchange Act, or unconstitutional under the reasoning of the
Cleary case.170 This is only one phase of the evaporation of governmental power in the operation of our federal system, which has left
marks all across the law, from business organizations to family relations; amendments from this point of view are only another example
of a more general problem which some generation of Americans is going
to have to face. If constitutional, the federal body would either be administering amendment statutes passed and altered by the states, or
Congress would have to assert power to enact its own general amending
laws for state corporations. In any case, federal power could probably
be established for only a limited group of corporations, and it is very
doubtful that piecemeal control would confer benefits equal to its cost.
Hence it seems simpler and more satisfactory to leave the matter to the
courts, but to help them with better legislative tools. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider methods of improving judicial control.
(d) The Fairness of Plans. Many writers have suggested, principally in connection with accrued dividends, that a more general and
flexible test of "fairness" be substituted for the rigid tests of validity
now in use.171 These proposals originate in an analogy to the "fairness"
170 Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 56 S.Ct. 235
(1935). The Court held invalid a federal statute which authorized state building and loan
associations to incorporate under federal law, upon vote of a majority of their stockholders.
There is a beginning of federal control over the amendment practices of state corporations, under guidance of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in new section 20b of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 62 Stat. 162 (1948), 49 U.S.C. (Supp. 1949) §20b, which provides for modification of the securities of railroads in certain circumstances. This statute is
discussed in Hand and Cummings, "The Railroad Modification Law," 48 CoL. L. R.Ev.
689 (1948); Hand and Cummings, "Consensual Securities Modification," 63 HARv. L.
R.Ev. 957 (1950); Dodd, "Preferred Shareholders' Rights-The Engineers Public Service
Company Case,'' 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 298 at 306 (1949); see also Billyou, "Corporate Mortgage Bonds and Majority Clauses,'' 57 YALE L.J. 595 at 606 ff. (1948). The section is also
discussed in comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1291 (1949). This material came to the writer's attention after this article was written.
171 See notes: 52 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1331 at 1333 (1939); 54 HARv. L. R.Ev. 488 at 493
ff. (1941). There are leanings in this direction in my article, "The Power to Remove Ac•
crued Dividends by Charter Amendment," 40 CoL. L. R.Ev. 633 at 648 (1940).
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tests of the reorganization cases,1 72 but the practical reason for them
is that the complex amendments possible under the reclassification
statutes now in force seem to defy treatment according to any other
method. As the discussion has shown, in many of these cases it is impossible to affirm with any confidence whether the new rights are worth
more, less, or as much as, the old ones; as long as the burden of proof
is on the dissenter to establish unfairness, it is difficult for him to prove
his case. The test of fairness would make it easier for the court to protect dissenters in proper cases, while not closing the door on any amendment shown to be necessary.
If such a test were proposed as a substitute for proof by the corporation that the amendment was necessary, there would be a grave ·
objection to it. It is so vague that property interests ought not be
subjected to it unless the need is great. But coming after proof of necessity, the test offers additional security to those who lose by the amendment and then it has a valuable function. In addition, if the voluntary
amendments continue to be sustained, this test would offer a means of
giving the dissenter more protection than he now receives from a mechanical application of the statutes.
"Fairness" as a method of dealing' with amendment cases could be
introduced by the courts themselves, without additional legislation,
either by construing the statutes as requiring it, or by imposing it as
an equitable limitation of amending powers. Hence the test has, to
recommend it, immediate availability to any court that chooses to use it.
So much, then, can be said in favor of introducing this method.
On the other side, even the limited literature which has appeared
thus far shows that there would be serious differences concerning the
application of the test in individual cases and great difficulty in arriving at a workable definition or definitions of it. For example, since
objections to plans result from their tendency to throw losses on the ·
senior class; an analogy to the rule of strict priority in reorganization is
suggested at once. Yet the two writers who have discussed this subject
most fully are agreed that unmodified strict priority based upon the
liquidation rights of the preferred stock would be improper. Professor
Dodd indicates that even if the value of the assets is less than the
liquidation rights of the preferred stock, the latter loses value simply
from the fact that the common stock is in existence with some claims to
172 The comparison is thoroughly discussed in Dodd, ''Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 HA.nv. L. RBv. 780 (1942).
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ownership.173 Professor Latty does not believe that the priority of the
preferred stock should necessarily be identified with its liquidation preferences, emphasizes that it should receive something of value for what it
gives up, and proposes measurement of value, at least in some cases, in
terms of estimated future earning power.174 On the other hand, it has
been proposed that if the common stock is valued as worthless its voting
power should be taken away,1 75 and an anonymous writer contends
that liquidation preferences are the best measure of absolute priority.176
It is- obvious that finding a test of "fairness" which would meet with
general approval would be an extremely difficult task.
Another objection to the test is the extreme difficulty of applying
a definition even if it were agreed upon. Any test so far proposed would
173

See Dodd, "Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 HARv. L. Rnv. 780 at 795

(1942).
174 See Latty, "Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination,"
29 VA. L. Rnv. 1 esp. at 27 ff., 29 ff., and 39-40 (1942).
175 The court in Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 53 F. Supp.
198, suggested that the Delaware statutes should be amended to provide for valuation of the
common stock and for removing its voting power if it is found to be worthless. The decision
was later affirmed in (3d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 701. This suggestion has been approved
as far as it goes, by Professor Dodd, "Accrued Dividends -in Delaware Corporations-From
Vested Right to Mirage," 57 HARV, L:Rnv. 894 at 899 (1944), but he notes that many
unfair plans are proposed when the common stock is not worthless, and that the remedy
would therefore only be partial.
I would like to file a caveat. Although the common stock has no asset value, its control of the corporation may be valuable and it may therefore have a market value, or an
exchange value of some kind. There is no covenant that it shall lose control when the
capital has been impaired. Destruction of this propertY interest without compensation would,
it seems to me, violate the due process clause at least, and perhaps the contracts clause.
Altogether this method of approach seems to raise serious problems, both of policy and of
constitutional law. In framing another suggested method of approach, I have tried to give
recognition to this value of the common stock.
It should be noted that a recent Iowa decision, State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239
Iowa 1298, 31 N.W. (2d) 853 (1948), lends some color to the contention in the Barrett
case that the common stock's voting power should be taken away if it is worthless. The
corporation was chartered in Delaware, and operated a utility in Iowa. The amendment
created a new class of common stock, and provided that all three classes of its old preferred
stock should be exchanged for it in specified ratios. The amendment provided also that a
block of 100,000 shares of old no par common stock should be exchanged for 39,468 shares
of the new $15 par common stock. The state, in an equity action, asked, inter alia, that
the old common stock be declared worthless and the new common issued for it be divested
of value and control. The court granted this relief. It found that the net assets of the corporation were several millions of dollars less than the par value and accrued dividends of
the old preferred.stock, so that the old common was worthless and the issuance of the new
common for it violated an Iowa statute. The effect of the decision is to determine the rights
of the old common stockholders according to the statute of the state where the corporation
was doing business and had assets. It is the only case found in which the validity of the
amendment was determined otherwise than by reference to the statutes of the charter state.
It suggests a method of limiting the effects of legislation in the corporation states, but it is,
of course, doubtful that other courts would follow the decision.
170 See note, 54 YAI.l! L. J. 840 at 850, 852 (1945).
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require valuation of the assets, some means of ascertaining the value of
the preferred stock-a hard problem in itself if the liquidating preferences were not accepted as the measure-and some means of valuing
the common stock. Any test, moreover, would sometimes require determination of the future earnings of the corporation and of the future
market value of the various classes of stock. The risks of error in such
inquiries as these are obvious, and property interests that depend on
them are precariously situated.
It seems objectionable to subject the interests of stockholders to such
doubtful investigations. The risk is of course no greater than in reorganization, and the interests of stockholders are perhaps of less dignity
than those involved in the reorganization cases. But reorganization is at
least limited to cases of proved insolvency; it is better than the status
quo, which would be a race of diligence, followed by piecemeal liquidation at sacrifice prices. Hence if the reorganization test of "fairness" is
unsatisfactory, it is at least better than the alternative. That is not so
clear in the amendment cases. In the greater part of them there is no
proof that the corporation even needs more money, or has any definite
plan for getting it when the plan is effective. In almost none of them
is there anything like a demonstration that the corporation will not remain a going concern without the amendment. The economic pressures which compel the adoption of drastic remedies in reorganization,
then, are absent in the amendment cases. It is submitted that the fairness test, though it offers a means of avoiding the more objectionable
results which How from voluntary amendments and mergers, is not a
true solution of the recapitalization problem.
Accordingly, I propose another solution, which seems to be simpler
and to avoid the difficulties, especially of valuation, which are inherent
in the fairness test. It is based on the assumption that if there is need
for an amendment the corporation can prove it, and that in the absence of such proof, it is better to keep the status quo than to force the
stockholders into expensive inquiries, whose outcome is likely to be in-conclusive. First, require the dissenter to prove that the amendment
alters his interests in the property of the corporation, or at least, that it
changes them into something whose value is doubtful. Second, require
the corporation to prove the specific need which justifies an amendment. Third, if such proof is made, let the majority further sustain the
burden of proving that there is no other solution of the difficulty which
would not affect the relative priorities of the classes, or which would
not affect them as much. The inquiry thus opened should cover other
means of raising money, including credit financing. If the corporation
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alleges that the amendment is to prepare for common stock financing,
the majority should be required to prove the bona £ides of that intention, and that there is a reasonable certainty that it can and will be
carried out if the amendment is permitted. No weight should be given
to the fact that a majority has approved the amendment, and, more important still, no consideration should be given to the fact that the common stockholders would not vote in favor of an alternative which
would be less drastic. If the majority fails to sustain the burden of proof
on these issues, that is, if it fails to disprove feasible and less drastic
alternatives,177 let the court enjoin the plan entirely, or so much of it as
puts pressure on dissenters. The worst that can follow from this procedure is that the status quo would be maintained, that is, the preferred
stock would be left with its preferences and the common stock with its
control, which it could use to carry out one of the alternatives, if it
chose. This suggestion is less likely to produce decisions in favor of
amendments than the fairness plan, but that is in its favor if it be true
that the real reason behind most of the amendments is to improve the
standing of the common stock. At the same time it seems to direct the
inquiry into concrete questions of practical financing, rather than into
difficult questions of comparative valuation.178
171 It is questionable how this suggestion would be received by some authorities. In
Doyle v. Milton, (D.C. N.Y. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 281, the plaintiff, a common stockholder,
sued to enjoin an amendment to which he objected, so far as relevant here, on the ground
that a prior stock would be issued in such a way as to give control to directors and officers
of the corporation. The attack rested principally on the ground that the material used to
solicit proxies was false, in that it failed to discuss possible alternatives to the proposed
plan. The court denied relief, partly on the ground that the failure to state alternatives
was not a falsehood. A memorandum submitted in the case by the S.E.C. stated that
alternatives need not be described in proxy material according to its rules. The court added
that such a requirement would be impractical.
It must be admitted that the consideration of alternatives would not be easy. But probably no easy method of handling the amendment cases will ever be found, and the question is whether it is not more fair, and less difficult than other ways.
Professor Latty, in "Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination," 29 VA. L. REv. 1 at 50 (1942), would require the corporation to prove the need
for amendment. He also appears to approve consideration by the court of alternatives to the
plan actually proposed. It is not clear whether the fact that a plan is "fair" should, in his
opinion, exclude the study of alternatives. But he seems to regard the introduction of a
"fairness" test as a necessary development. My own belief is that intensive study of alternatives, a method not yet tried, would, on the strength of the cases so far decided, eliminate the need for a "fairness" test, and that the difficulties of defining and applying such
a test are persuasive reasons for using the other method.
178 It should perhaps be reiterated [see note 56 in Part I of this article, 49 MicH. L.
REv. 363 at 380 (1951)] that the emphasis upon the determination of facts in this discussion does not rest upon a belief that facts by themselves will solve the problems presented
by accrued dividends. The decisions of cases rest, in the end, upon propositions of value,
that is, upon the determination and application of standards of value to the facts in the
case. But propositions or standards of value cannot be derived from facts alone. As the
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This proposed solution, of course, is as immediately available under
existing statutes as the fairness test is; it could be applied as a matter of
interpretation of the statutes, or as an equitable limitation of the powers
granted by them. So far as legislative action can help, it is suggested
that the broad amending statutes now commonly enacted should be
qualified in the following ways: (a) when an amendment shifts property among classes, the majority should expressly be subjected to the
burden of proving that there is a public interest, applicable to the precise facts of the case, which requires an amendment; (b) if such proof
is made, the majority shrould be required to sustain the further burden
of proving that there is no alternative which would not shift property
interests, or would not shift them so drastically. The precise enumeration of these issues, and the express allocation of the burden of proof in
these terms, would relieve the courts of the difficulties presented by the
present statutes which grant amending power in absolute terms. With
this much assistance from the legislatures, it seems that they would be
both willing and able to clear up most of the objectionable practices revealed by the cases.
One thing is clear. If the present course of decisions is continued,
it is a serious question whether investors can safely purchase preferred
stock at a price above the common stock of the same corporation. In all
frankness, such certificates should now bear on their faces a statement
that they are subject to alteration in a great variety of ways, all to their
detriment, and that if business is bad, losses will be visited upon them,
regardless of the liquidation and other preferences which they have on
paper. It seems not unlikely that corporations will find that the temporary expedients which they have adopted will make it more difficult
to attract that part of the market which prefers security to speculation.
The short term solution contains the germs of a long term problem
in threatening destruction of the value of preferred stock as an investment.179
cases stand, however, it seems that what is more needed than anything else at the present
time is accurate knowledge of the facts concerning the influence of accrued dividends upon
the public. This is a prerequisite, it seems, to the formation of value judgments having any
lasting validity in this area of the law.

179 Concerning the fear that present amendment policies will have dangerous effects
upon preferred stock as an investment device, see notes: 26 MINN. L. RBv. 387 at 394
(1942); 4 UNIV. Cm. L. R:sv. 645 at 657 (1937); 54 YAL:S L. J. 840 at 852 (1945).

